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W ho is a refugee? The most widely used definition is given by Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country…” This definition has been widened in certain trea-
ties—including the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity, the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration (in Latin America), and the European Union’s 2004 and 
2011 Qualification Directives—to include those suffering from persecution on other 
grounds and those fleeing generalized violence such as war or armed insurrection. 
Refugee policy differs from regular immigration policy in two respects. First, in 
high-income countries, the immigration stream focuses on two groups: individuals 
with family ties to the receiving country (as is common in Italy, Spain, Japan, Israel, 
and the United States), or individuals deemed to meet specific labor market criteria 
(for example, the point systems used in Canada and Australia, or the US H-1B visa 
system). Immigration policies can be interpreted as serving the interests of the host-
country population, either specific individuals such as the sponsors of those coming 
through family reunification, or the wider economy as in the case of skill-selective 
labor migration. By contrast, refugees are admitted on the grounds of the benefit 
to them of escaping persecution rather than for any direct benefit to the host society 
or certain members of it. Indeed, the sole criterion of having a “well-founded fear 
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of persecution” is specific to the individual refugee and does not depend on the 
“value” of that person to the host country. Rather, the rationale for the host society 
of providing a safe haven for refugees is much more indirect: to meet basic humani-
tarian concerns. 
Second, while immigration policy involves characteristics that are relatively 
straightforward to verify, the definition of a refugee is much more subjective. 
Assessing the authenticity of applications for asylum requires destination coun-
tries to make an individual assessment, often based on inadequate or incomplete 
evidence (for example, is a particular migrant truly under threat for political or 
religious beliefs in that person’s home country?). Also, it usually involves an evalua-
tion of the situation in origin countries (for example, what is the extent of human 
rights abuse?). It can be difficult to separate refugees as defined in international 
agreements from those who wish to migrate for economic reasons. This is because 
most of the hundreds of thousands who apply for political asylum each year come 
from countries that are both strife-prone and poor, places where suffering genuine 
fear of persecution is a distinct possibility, and also where the economic gains to 
emigration would be large.
Most of those fleeing civil wars and human rights abuses are forcibly displaced 
within their own country or seek refuge in a country nearby. But the focus here is 
on asylum seekers who have grabbed the headlines and created public debate by 
migrating to the stable, safe, and secure countries of the West. Asylum migration 
has a long history, but the number arriving at the doors of the rich world has been 
on the increase. In 2015−2016, more than a million migrants from Syria and other 
Middle Eastern and Asian countries sought entry to the European Union and, from 
2018, migrant caravans traveling from Central American countries converged on 
the US border with Mexico. So what explains asylum migration, and how does it 
differ from other migrations? And how have policies towards refugees and asylum 
seekers evolved in response to changing social and political pressures? 
In this paper, I begin by presenting long-term trends on the number and compo-
sition of refugees and asylum seekers. The following section examines the political 
and institutional history that has drawn an increasingly sharp distinction between 
refugees and other types of migrants. Recent analysis has explored the determi-
nants of asylum migration and has attempted to evaluate the effects of policies such 
as tighter border controls and more restrictive evaluation of asylum applications. 
Against this background, I examine how changes in public opinion and politics are 
shaping asylum policies in the aftermath of recent surges in asylum applications. 
How Many Refugees?
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates the 
total number of refugees worldwide at the end of 2018 at 20.1 million. This is less 
than one-third of the total of 70.8 million “forcibly displaced persons,” which also 
includes those displaced within their home country (41.3 million) and Palestinians 
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(5.5 million) who come under a separate mandate (UNHCR 2019, 2). In 2018, refu-
gees were 7.6 percent of the stock of all international migrants (defined as those 
living outside their country of birth). As Figure 1 shows, the number of refugees 
grew faster than total migrants from 1960 to 1990. After declining to the mid-2000s, 
the total number of refugees has risen steeply, largely as a result of conflicts in Syria, 
South Sudan, and Myanmar. As of 2018, two-thirds of refugees are from just five 
countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. Of the total, 
85 percent of refugees are located in developing countries, often just across the 
border from the origin country, and about 30 percent of these languish in orga-
nized refugee camps. 
Each year, a small proportion of those recently displaced arrive as asylum seekers 
at the door of high-income Western countries in the hope of gaining recognition as 
refugees. In 2018, they were just 7 percent of those newly displaced (most of whom 
were internally displaced). The vast majority of asylum applicants in the developed 
world arrived as “spontaneous asylum seekers,” having migrated from the origin 
country on their own initiative and not as part of an organized program. In contrast, 
the number of refugees who were transferred directly from refugee camps through 
resettlement programs averaged less than 100,000 until recently, but increased to a 
temporary peak of 189,000 in 2016. In 2016, 51 percent of resettled refugees went 
to the United States and another 39 percent went to Australia and Canada, while 
Europe took less than 10 percent. Since the late 1980s, the overwhelming majority 
of spontaneous asylum seekers have arrived in Europe. A large proportion gained 
Figure 1 
Worldwide Migrants and Refugees since 1960 
Source: Migrants: World Bank, International Migrant Stock. Refugees: 1960 to 1995 from UNHCR, State 
of the World’s Refugees (2000) Annex 3; 2000 to 2010 from UNHCR Statistical Yearbook for 2007, Annex 
Table 20, and 2014, Annex Table 25; 2015 and 2018 from UNHCR Global Trends for 2015 and 2018, 
Annex Table 1.
Note: End year totals of international migrants (in 10 millions) and refugees (in millions). 
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unauthorized entry, often traversing continents and traveling by hazardous land and 
sea routes. Frontex, the European Union’s combined border force, estimated that 
unauthorized border crossings into the European Union increased from 105,000 in 
2009 to a peak of 1.82 million in 2015.
Figure 2 shows the annual number of new asylum claims lodged in Europe, 
North America, Australasia, and Japan/Korea over the last 37 years. Most of the 
long-run increase is accounted for by asylum applications to Europe, which received 
76 percent of total applications over the 37-year period, and especially Western 
Europe (71 percent). The total numbered less than 200,000 until the mid-1980s 
then rose steeply to a peak in 1992. This was the result of a surge of applications 
from Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, followed by an even larger increase 
in applications, mainly from and through Eastern Europe, that attended the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was followed a decade 
later by a wave of applicants fleeing the Kosovo conflict. But what stands out above 
all is the steep increase during the Syrian crisis to one and a half million applica-
tions per annum in 2015−2016.
Most asylum applicants come from low-income countries embroiled in civil 
wars, internecine strife, and human rights abuses. Table 1 shows the top 30 origin 
countries by total applications over the decade 2009–2018. The Middle East, Africa, 
and Asia are the most prominent source regions, but there are also important origin 
countries in Europe (Serbia, Russia, and Albania) and in Latin America (El Salvador, 
Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela). China and India appear on the list, even 
Figure 2 
Asylum Applications to Western Countries, 1982–2018 
Source: 1982 to 2000 from UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook for 2001, tables C1 and C2; 2001 to 2013 
from UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends, 2005, 2009, and 2013, table 1; 2014 to 2018 from OECD, 
International Migration Outlook 2019, table A3.
Note: Annual number of persons applying for asylum, excluding repeat applications and appeals.
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though the number of applications is small relative to their populations. Table 2 
reports applications for the top 20 destination countries. Germany and the United 
States received the largest number of applications over the decade, but relative to 
population, the leading country is Sweden with 49 applicants per 1,000 population, 
followed at some distance by Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland. 
Asylum applicants enter into a process to determine whether they qualify as 
refugees under the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention or are eligible for 
admission on other humanitarian grounds. The total recognition rates (Convention 
Table 1  
Asylum Applicants to Western Countries by Origin: Total, 2009–2018 
Origin 
country
Total  
(000s)
Origin
country
Total  
(000s)
Origin
country
Total  
(000s)
Syria 1,098.9 Albania 183.7 Georgia 97.4
Afghanistan 629.7 El Salvador 180.7 Guinea 87.3
Iraq 429.0 Somalia 176.1 Sri Lanka 84.0
Serbia 295.4 Mexico 160.4 Ukraine 79.3
Pakistan 275.2 Guatemala 138.3 Dem. Rep. Congo 71.0
Nigeria 252.8 Venezuela 133.9 Gambia 71.0
Eritrea 244.9 Bangladesh 123.8 Algeria 70.4
China 244.4 Honduras 109.9 Haiti 70.2
Russia 212.2 Turkey 106.9 Sudan 65.2
Iran 201.1 India  99.9 Mali 64.2
Source: Calculated from OECD, International Migration Database. 
Note: Asylum applications from the top 30 origin countries to the EU28 plus Australia, Canada, Japan, 
South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States over the decade 2009 to 2018.
Table 2 
Asylum Applicants to Western Countries by Destination: Total, 2009–2018
Destination
country
Total  
(000s)
Per 1,000 
population
Destination 
country
Total 
(000s)
Per 1,000 
population
Germany 1,986.4 24.4 Switzerland 210.7 25.9
United States 1,462.1  4.6 Belgium 195.4 17.6
France 665.1 10.1 Netherlands 185.8 11.0
Italy 553.9  9.2 Australia 167.5  7.2
Sweden 478.1 49.3 Spain 135.0  2.9
United Kingdom 318.0  4.9 Norway 109.9 21.6
Hungary 276.6 28.0 Poland  77.4  2.0
Canada 270.5  7.7 Denmark  75.2 13.3
Austria 263.9 30.8 Finland  67.4 12.4
Greece 245.9 22.5 Japan  63.5  0.5
Source: Calculated from OECD, International Migration Database. 
Note: Asylum applications over the decade 2009−2018 from all origin countries. The numbers in this 
table include applicants who were stateless or of unknown nationality. The figure for the United States 
includes both affirmative and defensive applications and has been adjusted by the OECD to reflect the 
number of individuals. 
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plus humanitarian) for 24 countries since 1982 are plotted in Figure 3. These recog-
nition rates were close together in the early 1980s, but a gap emerges as weaker 
forms of recognition were adopted in the face of the rising number of applications. 
The average total recognition rate over the most recent 37 years is just 36 percent 
(26 percent for Convention recognition). Even if successful appeals were taken into 
account, the share of those applying for asylum who receive some form of recogni-
tion would not exceed half. Unsuccessful applicants are legally required to leave 
the country either voluntarily or by deportation, although a significant proportion 
disappear into the informal economy and remain as undocumented immigrants.
The total recognition rate peaked in 1999 and again in 2016. This pattern 
reflects both variations in the gravity of asylum claims and changing policy towards 
them. In Europe, the shift towards tougher policy in the early 2000s was arrested 
in the following years as the EU’s Common European Asylum System came into 
effect. Against this background, the rising number of asylum claims recognized 
as valid increased, fueled by the so-called “Arab Spring,” to reach a crescendo in 
the Syrian migration crisis of 2015–2016, when the existing policies were tempo-
rarily suspended. The sharp fall in asylum applications after 2016 largely reflects 
the agreement between the European Union and the main transit country, Turkey, 
which stemmed the flow across the Aegean Sea. The decline in recognition rates 
represents a return to preexisting policies. But both the volume of applications and 
the average recognition rate remain high by historical standards as the underlying 
Figure 3 
The Refugee Recognition Rate for 24 Countries, 1982–2018 
Source: 1982 to 2005 from UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook for 2001 tables C26 and C29, and 2005 tables C27 
and C30; 2006 to 2018 from UNHCR, Global Trends for 2006 to 2018, table 10.
Note: The countries included in the weighted recognition rates are: the EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg), 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and 
the United States.
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pressures persist. It remains to be seen whether this really is a “paradigm shift,” as 
sometimes suggested (UNHCR Global Trends 2015, 3). 
Evolution of the International Refugee System
For centuries, those facing oppression and persecution—often on religious 
grounds—have sought sanctuary in other countries. From the Huguenots in the 
seventeenth century to the Russian Jews in the late nineteenth century, these 
groups moved in modest numbers and generally with little hindrance (Marrus 1985, 
chap. 1). Within Europe and the New World, border controls were minimal and 
the authorities made no formal distinction between those fleeing persecution and 
other migrants. However, there were tight restrictions on migration from Asia and 
from colonial dependencies. After World War I, more restrictive and selective immi-
gration policies were accompanied by the widespread introduction of passports as 
proof of identity. From that time, refugees emerged as a category distinct from other 
migrants. In the United States, immigration quotas by country of origin, introduced 
in 1921 and tightened in 1924, drastically restricted immigration from countries, 
some of which became sources of refugees. From then until 1952, refugees were 
neither formally included in immigration policy nor recognized separately. 
From 1920 to 1950, the international refugee regime evolved through several 
stages (Hathaway 1984). Refugees were initially considered to be those who had 
been displaced by war and only later as those facing individual persecution. The 
initial focus was on providing legal status for stateless Europeans in response to 
mass displacements across shifting borders in the aftermath of World War I. These 
included two million Poles and a million Germans as well as many thousands of 
Magyars, Greeks, and Armenians. In 1921, the newly established League of Nations 
created a High Commissioner for Refugees with a mandate to assist, firstly, displaced 
Russians and then other nationalities by negotiating the exchange, repatriation, 
and resettlement of refugees, one key element of which was the issue of internation-
ally recognized travel documents.1 With the rise of Fascism, the focus shifted in the 
1930s from the effects of displacement to the causes of persecution as group-specific 
mandates were issued, one of which applied to Jews fleeing Austria and Germany. 
The United States eased its eligibility criteria to admit a few thousand (but still did 
not fill its German quota until 1939), while more found sanctuary in France. But 
international diplomacy aiming to resettle larger numbers failed, and increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies around the world meant that there were few other 
havens for refugees (Loescher 2001, 31; Marrus 1985, chap. 3). 
World War II created even greater displacement. By 1945 there were over 
30 million displaced persons in Europe, not counting the 13 million ethnic Germans 
expelled mainly from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. At the end of 
the war, voluntary and official agencies assisted eight million European refugees, 
but a million more remained displaced. The initial focus on exiles from Fascism 
1 The first High Commissioner of Refugees, polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen, instigated the issuing of 
identity certificates, which became known as Nansen passports. 
82     Journal of Economic Perspectives
and Nazism then transformed into concern with those fleeing communism. The 
International Refugee Organization, created in 1946, was an initiative of the United 
States against Soviet opposition, and it specifically sought to distinguish between 
those fleeing persecution and those migrating for other reasons. It set out a defini-
tion of a refugee, which focused on the individual rather than the group and on the 
expectation of future persecution rather than on the circumstances of past displace-
ment. It also reflected a shift from viewing repatriation as the principal solution to 
refugee problems to establishing a role for permanent resettlement elsewhere. The 
successor organization to the International Refugee Organization, the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created in 1949, was 
followed in 1951 by the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The 
Convention built upon the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
included in Article 14 the right to seek asylum from persecution (Goodwin-Gill 
2008), and following the precedent of the International Refugee Organization, it 
enshrined individual fear of persecution as the criterion. 
The Refugee Convention (UNHCR 1951) includes three interlocking elements, 
which have shaped refugee policy up to the present. First, a signatory state must 
offer a procedure to assess whether or not each individual lodging a claim qualifies 
as a refugee under the Convention’s definition of being outside that person’s origin 
country and having a “well-founded fear of persecution” (Article 1). Second, while 
being on a country’s territory (or at the border) does not, of itself, guarantee access 
to the process, the so-called non-refoulement clause (Article 33(1)) forbids returning 
a person to a place where that person’s life or freedom would be threatened. Third, 
illegal entry or presence in the country does not prejudice admission to the proce-
dure for determining refugee status or the outcome of that process (Article 31). In 
addition, while the Convention does not provide the right to permanent residence, 
it does encourage host countries to “facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees” (Article 34). The Convention originally applied only to those displaced 
in Europe before 1951, but its scope was radically widened by the 1967 New York 
Protocol, which removed geographic and time limitations. It was gradually adopted 
worldwide and the number of signatory states increased from 60 in 1970 to 145 in 
2015. It is noteworthy that, in principle, there is no limit to the number of asylum 
applications a state is obliged to process and accept. 
The United States did not sign the 1951 Convention, and its policies diverged 
from those of Europe. Instead, it developed a series of initiatives, such as the 1952 
Escapee Program, which focused on refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. During the early years of the Cold War, refugees moving to the West were 
welcomed as a powerful symbol of Western superiority over communism, especially 
in the United States. Reflecting Cold War strategy, the bulk of refugees admitted 
to the United States during this period were from communist countries and were 
admitted for resettlement through executive orders outside of the immigration 
quota (Zucker and Zucker 1996, chap. 2). In the 1970s, the human rights agenda 
gained increasing popular support as, in the wake of the Vietnam War, the media fed 
public awareness of oppression and international conflicts in Latin America, Asia, 
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and Africa. This was reflected in growing support for humanitarian agencies such 
as Amnesty International, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, and Human 
Rights Watch, which was launched in the United States in 1978 (Neier 2012). It 
was also reflected in public policy: the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1974 (trade 
sanctions against nonmarket countries that denied the right to emigrate) and the 
creation of an Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in 1977. Finally, the US 
Refugee Act of 1980 established an annual refugee quota of 50,000, and in principle 
shifted the emphasis from country of origin to the plight of the individual, aligning 
more closely with the Refugee Convention. 
The Refugee Act widened the scope of US refugee policy, and it provided a 
procedure for refugee status determination, which was foreshadowed by Canada 
in 1976 and Australia in 1978. In these countries, while the main mechanism was 
resettlement direct from countries of first asylum, the door was also opened to 
spontaneous asylum seekers. The United States nevertheless continued with ad hoc 
measures and a focus on exiles from communism; for example, Cubans were favored 
over Haitians and Nicaraguans over Salvadorans and Guatemalans (UNHCR 2000, 
174–77). But of the two million that the United States resettled from 1975 to 1999, 
two-thirds were from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The Vietnamese boat people 
symbolized what was to follow, as the relatively liberal refugee regime of the 1980s 
faced severe challenges with growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, often 
arriving illegally and from ever-more remote parts of the world. The end of the Cold 
War, heralded by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
generated a surge in the numbers seeking asylum, just as the strategic value of refu-
gees receded (Zucker and Zucker 1996, 37–38). In Europe, the steep increase up 
to 1992 (shown in Figure 2) led to tougher policies that included visa restrictions 
and tougher status determination policies (shown in Figure 3). Most notable was 
the 1992 amendment to Germany’s Basic Law providing that asylum claims by appli-
cants who originated from safe countries of origin or who traveled though safe third 
countries were deemed to be manifestly unfounded (Hailbronner 1994). Across the 
Atlantic, the US Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 restricted access to asylum procedures for those arriving without documents. 
The further round of policy tightening that took place from the early 2000s 
in the face of rising applications was precipitated by the attacks of September 
11, 2001. This intensified concerns that asylum seekers from conflict-ridden 
countries presented not only an economic burden and social problem but also 
a security risk. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 increased border security and iden-
tity checks, and sweeping reforms were also introduced in Australia (2001) and 
Canada (2002). In Europe, stricter border controls and visa policies were aimed at 
denying access while tougher processing policies and less generous welfare provi-
sions were used to deter prospective applicants. But the first round of directives in 
the EU’s Common European Asylum System in the mid-2000s sought to prevent 
a race to the bottom in asylum policies by harmonizing policies and striking a 
balance between excluding economic migrants while protecting the rights of 
genuine refugees. Even though asylum policies have become more restrictive 
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since the 1980s, there has been no mass defection from the Refugee Conven-
tion, a treaty that was conceived in conditions very different from today. Thus, the 
key elements of the liberal post-World War II regime—the right to claim asylum 
and the non-refoulement provision—remain in place without regard to the numbers 
that this may imply. The European migration crisis of 2015–2016 and the migrants 
gathering on the US southern border since 2017 have put these principles under 
severe pressure and have opened once again the question of whether existing 
asylum policies are still fit for current purposes. 
What Drives Asylum Applications?
Existing studies have identified key factors that influence the number of refu-
gees. Davenport, Moore, and Poe (2003) found that the stock of refugees around 
the world could be explained mainly by genocide, civil war, dissident conflicts, and 
political regime transitions. Consistent with this, worldwide refugee numbers run 
parallel with indicators of conflict, which ascend steeply to a peak in 1992 and then 
decline before reversing from 2011 (Center for Systemic Peace 2018). Recent exam-
ples include the war in Syria and persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, but while 
the first produced large outflow to the West, the latter did not. In a study of bilateral 
refugee movements, Moore and Shellman (2007) found that, while most migrants 
moved to contiguous countries, movements beyond countries of first asylum were 
positively related to the locations of previous migrants, but were constrained by 
the costs of migration. Annual asylum applications to the developed world have 
increased on trend relative to the worldwide refugee stock as more migrants have 
moved beyond countries of first asylum. Taking the ratio of asylum applicants to the 
developed world (shown in Figure 2) to the world refugee stock (shown in Figure 1) 
as 100 in 1985, this index increased to 345 in 1995, 272 in 2005, and 674 in 2015.
Several studies have assessed the push and pull forces behind asylum applica-
tions to industrialized countries by analyzing panel data on the number of applicants 
by origin, by destination, and over time. The most important origin-country vari-
ables are political terror and lack of civil liberties; civil war matters less, perhaps 
because war per se does not necessarily confer refugee status (Hatton 2009, 2017a). 
There is weaker evidence that declines in origin-country income per capita leads to 
more asylum applications, which offers modest support to the view that economic 
migration is part of the story. Proximity and access are important in determining 
the volume of asylum applications. Countries that are small but nearby can generate 
large flows—as with a quarter of a million Cubans moving to the United States in the 
1970s and 400,000 Serbians and Montenegrins moving to the European Union in 
1995−2004—provided that the door is left ajar. But the growth of transit routes and 
migrant networks have fueled the upward trend of applications from more distant 
origins. For example, travel in caravans through Mexico combined with violence 
and drought at home, a growing diaspora, and mixed messages about future US 
policy all combined to boost migration from Central America (Capps et al. 2019). 
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How does asylum migration differ from migration though other channels? 
Studies of total migration flows—including both asylum and non-asylum migra-
tion—that share the same panel data structure produce similar but not identical 
findings. The most obvious difference is the much greater influence on asylum 
migration of terror and human rights abuse in origin countries. Another differ-
ence is that economic “pull factors” in destination countries are stronger and “push 
factors” from origin countries are weaker for non-asylum migration. For example, 
Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2013) report large and significantly positive 
effects of destination-country income per capita on migration, but smaller and 
sometimes insignificant negative effects of origin-country income.2 As in many 
migration models, the most powerful single variable influencing asylum-seeker 
flows to a country is the stock of previous migrants from the same origin. Under-
lying these network effects are historic factors shaping migration such as colonial 
ties, common language, and shared culture, as well as geographic proximity. The 
negative effect of distance is especially important for asylum applications, and it 
matters even in the presence of the migrant stock, something that probably reflects 
the greater costs and hazards of what, for many, is risky clandestine migration. 
A particularly important issue is whether, and to what extent, restrictive asylum 
policies reduce asylum applications, especially as these are often purposely designed 
for deterrence. Policies that may influence the volume of asylum applications can 
be divided into three types. First, policies such as border surveillance, visa policies, 
and carrier sanctions seek to deny admission to asylum procedures by restricting 
access to the border. In the European migration crisis of 2015−2016, countries in 
the EU’s eastern border adopted strict controls on border crossing and admission to 
asylum procedures. Second, rules that are applied in processing asylum claims can 
influence the likelihood that an applicant gains recognition. For example, when 
in 2013 Sweden granted all Syrian asylum seekers permanent instead of temporary 
residence, the number of applications more than doubled (Andersson and Jutvik 
2019). Third, restrictions on movement that apply during processing and cuts in 
welfare benefits, such as the 47 percent benefit cut introduced by Denmark in 2015, 
might also deter asylum applications.
These polices are hard to quantify, but they can be crudely represented by an 
index comprising dummy variables for changes in each subcomponent of policy. 
When these variables are included in a model of asylum applications, border 
controls and processing policies have significant deterrent effects while welfare poli-
cies do not (Hatton 2004, 2009, 2017a). One interpretation is that what matters 
most to asylum seekers is the prospect of gaining permanent settlement, whatever 
the short-term hardships. The wave of tougher border controls and processing 
2 A related issue is that most migrants are young, which is predicted by economic theory because the net 
present value of investing in migration is greater the longer the duration of expected future returns. 
Consistent with this insight, studies of migration find that emigration is greater the larger are the young 
cohorts (aged 15–29) in the origin country (Mayda 2010; Hatton and Williamson 2011; Hanson and 
McIntosh 2016). That may also be true of asylum seekers, most of whom are young, but this effect has 
not been thoroughly investigated. 
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policies that took place between 1997 and 2005 reduced applications to 19 major 
destination countries by nearly 30 percent. From 2005 to 2014, countries such as 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom continued to tighten their 
policies while others, including France, Italy, and especially Sweden, eased theirs, so 
that the overall effect was a modest increase in applications (Hatton 2017a, 464). In 
this light, it is not surprising that subsequent dramatic policy shifts in Europe had 
sizable effects on the volume of applications. The diverse incentives and deterrents 
can influence the characteristics of asylum applicants as well as the overall number. 
A study of migrants crossing the central and eastern Mediterranean routes in 2015 
and 2016 found that those who claimed to be fleeing persecution were more posi-
tively selected on education than economic migrants (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019). 
Those with low education were more often heading for countries with easier access 
to employment and more generous welfare states, but such intentions were also 
influenced by rising border restrictions on different routes. 
It is sometimes suggested that more restrictive policy adopted by one country 
simply deflects asylum applicants to others. For regular migration, there is some 
support for this view (Ortega and Peri 2013), and this might be particularly impor-
tant in the European Union, where nearby countries could be close substitutes. A 
careful test supports the deflection effect on asylum applications to third countries 
but finds it to be small (Barthel and Neumayer 2015). A possible reason is that the 
EU’s so-called Dublin Regulation (which was suspended in 2015−2016) requires 
that an applicant can lodge an asylum claim in only one country, normally the 
country of first arrival, which restricts potential access to asylum procedures at 
alternative destinations. It has also been suggested that more restrictive policies 
on other types of immigration could increase asylum flows to a country, as poten-
tial immigrants seek an alternative immigration channel. Here, too, the evidence 
supports a substitution effect. However, employment-based immigration policies 
became less restrictive on average in 19 major destinations from 1997 to 2014, and 
this reduced asylum applications on average by 9 percent (Hatton 2017a, 463). 
The effects of border controls are likely to be heterogeneous. Much of the 
evidence comes from the experience on the US-Mexico border. In the 1980s and 
1990s, undocumented migration across this border increased in tandem with 
manpower and expenditure on border control, suggesting that policy had little 
effect. Increasing apprehension rates at the main crossing points diverted migrants 
to other sectors where access is more difficult, which raised the cost of employing 
smugglers (“coyotes”) but had only modest effects on the total number of attempted 
crossings (Gathmann 2008; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016; Lessem 2018). Indeed, 
the majority of those apprehended were granted voluntary return to Mexico, only 
to repeat the attempt until successful, while those who crossed successfully were less 
likely to return. But barriers were strengthened and surveillance intensified further, 
and from 2005 on, tougher sanctions were imposed that included criminal proceed-
ings. Analysis of individual-level data on apprehensions for 2008–2012 indicates that 
this reduced the probability of re-apprehension within a year by nearly one-quarter 
(Bazzi et al. 2018). With the subsequent transition from single Mexicans looking 
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for work to Central American families seeking asylum, the United States faces new 
challenges at the border. 
Unauthorized crossings to Europe have long been made with the intention of 
applying for asylum and gaining permanent residence. Most of these migrants are 
from countries that do not share a land border, so that unauthorized travel often 
involves the costs and risks of long and difficult migration routes through other 
countries and/or across the Mediterranean. The changing importance of different 
migration routes to the European Union during the last decade is largely a result 
of the vagaries of enforcement policies at different crossing points, rather than of 
substitution between routes by migrants (Hatton 2017a, 475–79). A good example 
is when the “friendship agreement” of 2008 between Italy and Libya collapsed with 
the demise of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. This increased unauthorized migration 
through the central Mediterranean route between 2010 and 2012 by a factor of 
three. Friebel et al. (2018) show that the increase in actual and intended migration 
came from countries relatively near Libya. There was almost no increase in migra-
tion, actual or intended, from more distant countries such as those in the Middle 
East and no reduction in travel through other routes.
Perhaps the most dramatic recent example of enforcement effects is how the 
massive surge of migrants through the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, 
as a result of the war in Syria, was brought to an abrupt halt after the 2016 agreement 
between the European Union and Turkey. The number of unauthorized crossings 
through the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean fell from 1.65 million in 
2015 to 54,500 in 2017, with only modest effects on the numbers traveling through 
other routes. Although the number crossing from Libya to Lampedusa (Italy) and 
Malta remained high, most of these migrants were from sub-Saharan Africa and the 
three leading nationalities were Nigeria, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire (Frontex 2018, 
43). This experience indicates that land and sea crossings can be stemmed, but only 
with draconian policies and in cooperation with transit countries. 
Public Opinion, Politics, and Policy
The dramatic increase in asylum applications in recent years has created head-
lines and alarmed policymakers. There is a widespread perception that public 
opinion has shifted dramatically against immigrants in general and asylum seekers 
in particular. This has been linked with increasing support for populist political 
parties, particularly those of the far right. Even when such parties do not get into 
government, they may shift the agendas of mainstream political parties towards a 
more anti-immigration stance. 
What does survey evidence show on how public opinion has shifted? In 2002, 
2014, and 2016, the European Social Survey (ESS) asked respondents if they 
agreed/disagreed with the statement: “the government should be generous in 
judging applications for refugee status.” The first row of Table 3 reports the average 
over 17 countries of the proportion of respondents that disagreed or strongly 
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disagreed with the statement. From 2002 to 2014, on average, there was a fall 
in the proportion of those expressing anti-refugee sentiment by 14.3 percentage 
points. In 2014, anti-refugee preference averaged 26.6 percent, and it was less 
than 50 percent in all 17 countries, ranging from 7.6 percent in Portugal to 
47.0 percent in the Netherlands. But from 2014 to 2016, the decline in anti-
refugee sentiment was sharply reversed everywhere except Ireland, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. In Germany, anti-refugee sentiment increased 17 percentage 
points and in Hungary by 26 percentage points. Trends in opinion on immigra-
tion policy are rather different, even towards otherwise similar groups such as 
immigrants from minority ethnic backgrounds and those from poorer countries 
outside Europe. Anti-immigration responses are taken as the percentage who 
prefer admitting “a few” or “none,” compared with the alternatives “many” or 
“some.” As Table 3 shows, from 2002 to 2014, there was much less decline in nega-
tive sentiment towards immigrants as compared with refugees. There was some 
softening of views towards ethnic minority immigrants but not towards those from 
poor countries, with some reversal of trends from 2014 to 2016. 
The United States presents a somewhat different picture. Each June, Gallup asks 
if immigration should be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased (Gallup 
2014). The percentage of respondents wanting immigration to be decreased fell 
from 49 in 2002 to 41 in 2014, 38 in 2016, and 35 in 2019. Despite the growing 
support for immigration, there is evidence of increasing concern about the situation 
on the border with Mexico, which 74 percent of respondents in 2019 considered to 
be a “crisis” or a “major problem.” But when asked about admitting refugees who 
have left Honduras and other Central American countries, 57 percent approved 
Table 3 
Anti-refugee and Anti-immigration Opinion in 17 European Countries
2002 2014 2016
Change 
2002–2014
Change
2014–2016
Applicants for refugee status 
 (% disagree or disagree strongly)
40.9 26.6 36.1 –14.3 9.5
Immigrants of different race/ethnic group 
 (% few or none)
48.3 42.3 41.8 –5.9 –0.5
Immigrants from poor countries 
 (% few or none)
47.8 50.4 43.9 2.6 –6.5
Source: European Social Survey, cumulative file. 
Note: The first row is the percentage of respondents who “disagreed” or “disagreed strongly” with the 
statement: “the government should be generous in judging applications for refugee status.” The second 
and third rows are the percentages of respondents who replied “a few” or “none” to the question: “to 
what extent do you think [country] should allow. . . people of a different race or ethnic group from 
most [country] people” and “. . . people from the poorer countries outside Europe.” These are the 
unweighted averages for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK.
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while 60 percent either opposed or strongly opposed expanding the construction of 
walls along the US-Mexico border. In this respect, opinion in the United States has 
some parallels with that in Europe on the eve of the migration crisis. 
Two important elements contribute to the overall climate of opinion towards 
asylum seekers. First, public opinion is very strongly against unauthorized entry. 
Among respondents to a survey of eight European countries in 2013, an average of 
75 percent were “worried about illegal immigration,” as compared with 29 percent 
who were “worried about legal immigration.” For the United States, these figures were 
61 percent and 25 percent, respectively.3 It is likely that the increase in unauthorized 
arrivals has further hardened attitudes towards spontaneous asylum seekers. Second, 
and related to this, the salience of immigration has increased. Salience refers to how 
important a respondent thinks an issue is, as distinct from the respondent’s position or 
preference over the issue (as reported in Table 3). One measure of salience is recorded 
in the Eurobarometer surveys, which ask respondents about the two most important 
issues facing the country. From 2004 to 2012, roughly 10 percent of those in the survey 
ranked immigration in their top two issues. But in 2015, this shot up to over 30 percent 
for the European Union as a whole and a whopping 75 percent in Germany. 
Populist parties have been gaining influence across Europe, and although they 
vary widely in other ways, they typically share a strong anti-immigration stance. In 
Italy, votes for the centre-right coalition in the national elections of 2001–2008 were 
positively influenced by the proportion of foreign-born in the local population 
(Barone et al. 2016). In Austria, votes for the far-right Freedom Party in elections 
from 1979 to 2013 are causally related to the increase in immigration (Halla, 
Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017). In districts of Hamburg, Germany, voting for the 
far-right parties in state and national elections in 1987–2000 is linked to the share of 
immigrants (Otto and Steinhardt 2014). Across Europe, votes for nationalist parties 
in European elections are positively affected by the local share of low-skilled immi-
grants, especially those from outside Europe (Moriconi et al. 2018). These findings 
reflect both economic interests and cultural concerns, and they suggest that the 
(pro-immigrant) “contact effect” is overwhelmed by a “group threat effect,” which 
reflects both fear of competition and cultural concerns. But these findings relate to 
immigration generally and not specifically to refugees or asylum seekers. 
By exploiting the (exogenous) placing of refugees in localities in Denmark in 
1986−1998, Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm (2019) find causal evidence of a link 
between the presence of refugees and voting for anti-immigration parties in rural 
areas but the opposite effect in the main urban areas (consistent with group threat and 
contact effects, respectively). The recent refugee crisis of 2015–2016 fueled support 
for anti-immigrant parties, but this effect varied between countries and localities. In 
Upper Austria, support for the Freedom Party increased by less in municipalities that 
3 These figures were derived from the database for Transatlantic Trends 2013 (Stelzenmueller et al. 
2013). In a 2014 Gallup poll, 77 percent of US respondents thought that controlling US borders to 
halt the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States was either “very important” or “extremely 
important” for government policy. 
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hosted refugee centers, but by more in border municipalities that migrants passed 
through on their way to Germany (Steinmayr 2018). Exposure to migrant arrivals 
on Greek islands also increased opinion in favor of exclusion and added electoral 
support for the far-right party, Golden Dawn (Hangartner et al. 2019; Vasilakis 2018; 
Dinas et al. 2019). This evidence suggests that, against a background of rising coun-
trywide salience, contact or proximity to refugees mitigated or had mixed effects on 
the rise in voting for anti-immigrant parties, while direct experience of unauthorized 
migration boosted it. 
There is much less evidence exploring the last link in the chain running from 
immigration to public attitudes and then on to changes in immigration policy. One 
strand of evidence suggests that higher public salience of immigration is associated 
with more restrictive asylum policies (Hatton 2017b). But because the legislative 
process is often protracted and the outcome uncertain, the immediate effects of 
shifting attitudes are more likely to be on enforcement within the existing policy 
framework. For example, surges in asylum applications are associated with slightly 
lower asylum-seeker recognition rates in European countries, but there is no clear 
relationship with the strength of far-right political parties in government (Neumayer 
2005; Toshkov 2014). 
In the European Union, the Common European Asylum System has increas-
ingly constrained the policies of individual governments. But the migration crisis 
of 2015–2016, along with the collapse of border controls in southern Europe and 
Germany’s short-lived open door policy pitched this policy regime into disarray. The 
public backlash against asylum migrants largely reflected concerns about unauthor-
ized immigration, but it also presented an opportunity for further reform (Trauner 
2016). The EU agreement with Turkey over the movement of Syrians, noted earlier, 
was followed in 2016 by the transformation of the EU’s border force, Frontex, into a 
more integrated European Border and Coastguard Agency, with increased executive 
power and greater financial resources. The reforms also include a doubling of the 
EU’s Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund and the transformation of the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office into a full-fledged EU Agency for Asylum, with greater 
operational powers. The crisis also led to measures to redistribute 170,000 asylum 
seekers from Greece and Italy, even in the face of opposition by four member states. 
This was a modest breakthrough for a policy of European burden-sharing that has 
long been discussed, but not acted upon. 
Recent experience has led some to criticize as inefficient an asylum system that 
provides incentives to engage in risky unauthorized migration, only for the majority 
of such migrants to fail to gain recognition as refugees (Hatton 2017a). Tighter 
border controls reduce unpopular unauthorized migration, but they exclude both 
economic migrants and genuine refugees. An alternative would be more like the 
Australian system where tough border controls are accompanied by a resettlement 
scheme which, if scaled up on a per capita basis to the EU population, would admit 
around 375,000 refugees per year. Substituting resettlement for spontaneous asylum-
migration was at the core of the EU-Turkey agreement, which provided that for every 
Syrian migrant returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian refugee 
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would be resettled from Turkey to an EU member state. With that provision as back-
ground, in 2017, the EU adopted an expanded resettlement program of 50,000—or 
five times the number of the program launched in 2008. In contrast, the United 
States has moved in the opposite direction by reducing the resettlement target as the 
specter of spontaneous asylum-seeking increased. The US resettlement program of 
96,900 in 2016, which was more than half of the worldwide total among developed 
countries, was reduced to just 22,900 in 2018. 
Conclusion
Concern over refugees has increased in recent years as the numbers have surged. 
While most refugees are located in low-income neighboring countries where they first 
found asylum, the increasing number applying for asylum in the Western world has 
attracted widespread attention. These trends should be understood against the back-
ground of the evolution of international policy towards refugees and the changing 
incentives for asylum migration. The terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
asylum policies built upon it have provided clear incentives for spontaneous migra-
tion from poor, strife-prone countries to the developed world. While the evolution of 
policy sharpened the distinction between refugees and other immigrants, that differ-
ence has become increasingly blurred among asylum migrants. 
Since the early 2000s, public attitudes towards genuine refugees have become 
more favorable, but concerns about unauthorized arrivals have increased. In 
Europe, these concerns came to a head in the migration crisis of 2015–2016, and 
the backlash from that experience has led to a range of policy reforms, particularly 
tougher border controls. But it also marked a small step towards favoring resettle-
ment over spontaneous asylum-seeking. Meanwhile the United States has shifted 
the other way: with a leaky southern border and public support for the Central 
American refugees, the government has drastically cut its resettlement program. It 
remains to be seen whether the tougher border controls that have been proposed 
will in time be accompanied by a return to a more generous resettlement quota. 
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